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MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW

Constitutional Law: Due Process*
Despite the appearance of the more recent mechanical devices, the
radio and the airplane, upon the horizon of science, the motor car has
not yet been replaced as a fruitful source of litigation. High pressure
advertising of the several "playgrounds" of the nation, coupled with
the manufacture of a large variety of motor cars whose serial numbers
bear seven digits, has served to deluge both the highways and the
courts with much dispute. In view of the speed of the automobile,
and the habits of men, it is a natural consequence that the legislatures
of the several states are attempting to control the flood of nonresident
motorists within their borders, at least to the extent of providing to
their citizens a convenient and just method of reaching the purse
strings of offending visitors.
The present case arose thus: The state of Massachusetts enacted
a statute which in substance provided that the mere use of a public
highway of that state by a nonresident motorist implies, ipso facto, the
appointment of the state registrar as his true and lawful attorney for
the purpose of receiving process in any action arising out of any
accident or collision in which the nonresident motorist may be involved
while operating a motor vehicle on any highway of the said state.
It further provides that a copy of the process served must be sent to
the defendant by registered mail. The defendant in this action, (appellant here) a resident of Pennsylvania, was alleged to have negligently
and wantonly driven his automobile on a public highway of Massachusetts, and by reason thereof, struck and injured the plaintiff (defendant
in error). Jurisdiction was obtained under the above statute, that is,
by serving upon the registrar the process, and mailing a copy thereof
to the appellant. The appellant contested the jurisdiction, contending
that the statute was in violation of the due process clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. The court reached its conclusion by consideration of the following cases:.
Pennoyer v. Neff' promulgates the proposition that the process of
one state cannot run into another and summon a party there domiciled
to respond to proceedings against him; that notice sent outside the
state to a nonresident is unavailing to give jurisdiction in an action
against him personally for the recovery of money. The case in
question reconciles itself with the above propounded rule by the fact
that the use of the highway by a nonresident motorist is a positive act
of appointing an attorney for receiving process, and thus valid jurisdiction is acquired.
Hendrick v. Maryland2 is cited as authority for the proposition that
the state's power to regulate the use of its highways extends to their
use by nonresidents as well as by residents. The court says, "In the
absence of national legislation covering the subject, a state may rightfully prescribe uniform regulations necessary for public safety and
order in respect to the operation upon its highways of all motor vehicles. This is but an exercise of the police power uniformly recognized
as belonging to the states and essential to the preservation of the
health, safety, and comfort of their citizens."
* Hess v. Pawloski, 47 Sup. Ct. Rep. 632.
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NOTES AND COMMENT

In Kane v. New Jersey,3 a situation similar to the case under discussion, the appellant contended that a statute requiring the registration
of nonresident motorists and the appointment of the secretary of state
as attorney for receiving process was in violation of the due process
clause. In that case the court recognized the power of the state to
actually exclude such persons as would refuse to comply with the
statute, from entering the state. In answer to the contention that such
a statute is discriminatory, the Supreme Court held that the basic principles of the law were to render equal protection of the law to residents
as well as to nonresidents It is clear that hefore the passage of such
statute, residents were at a disadvantage in attempting to get jurisdiction of a nonresident offender. By comparing the action of the
New Jersey Legislature to an analagous crime situation, the court
reasoned that the ability to enforce criminal penalties for transgression
as an aid toward securing observance of laws would likewise apply
to the enforcement of the observance of the civil law. There is no
discrimination against nonresidents, denying them the equal protection
of the law, but on the contrary, it puts nonresidents upon an equal
basis with residents.
It follows, therefore, in logical sequence, that if a state has the
power to exclude motorists from entering its borders upon the refusal
of such motorists to comply with its statutes, the state may declare the
use of its highways by nonresident motorists the equivalent of appointment of an attorney upon whom process may be served, and so the
court held in the instant case. It is a progressive and material step toward the protection of citizens of a state possessing such a law from any
disadvantage they may have suffered by reason of not being able to
obtain jurisdiction of an offending nonresident motorist.
STEWART G. HONECK
Navigable Waters.
State Railroad Commission must determine compensation to be paid
state as a prerequisite of contract for removing material from bed of
navigable lake, and the requirement of "compensation to be paid" to
state for taking material connotes idea of use of money. Rights
of riparian owners to center of beds of navigable streams and rivers
and constitutional rights of such owners. Power of the state to dispose
of materials in and under navigable waters.
The importance of Section 31.02 (5) of the Wisconsin Statutes is
fully determined in a recent decision handed down by the Wisconsin
Supreme Court in the case of Angelo et al. v. Railroad Commission.'
W. B. Angelo and other riparian owners on Lime Lake, Portage
County, sought to enjoin the defendant Railroad Commission from
action under Section 31.02 (5) Stats. in conferring authority upon
certain persons to take marl from the bed.
This lake covers fifty-nine acres and has been used for boating,
hunting and fishing. It was not meandered in the U. S. Government
survey. The patents from the United States conveyed as land the
entire area. There is no showing whether it is connected with waters
flowing into Lake Michigan or the Mississippi and the county map
indicates that it has no apparent outlet.
242 U.S. i6o.
217 N.W. 570. (Wis.)
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